Debates about constitutional design in democratic transition and consolidation are always contentious. Two fundamental queries faced by new democracies are about the governmental systems and electoral systems. Within the governmental systems, the debates are between presidentialism and parliamentarism, while in the electoral system, the contested ideas are plurality/majority systems and proportional system.
Some theorists argue that the governmental systems, be it presidentialism or parliamentarism, shapes and gives direction to the political arena (Linz, 1990; Linz & Valenzuela, 1994; Stephan & Skach, 1993; Mainwaring, 1993; Cheibub, 2007). Others argue that electoral and party systems matter most given their role as source and entry mechanism to the political arena (Duverger, 1964; Horowitz, 1990; Powel, 2000). How political posts are filled and how power is distributed, shape the construction of political arena as well as political relations. Other theorists argued combination or hybrid of the political institutions and economic development could lead to the more stable political conditions (Przeworski, et.all, 1996). However, when it comes to the role of political institutions in a democracy, no theorists seem to be totally firm with their stands.
Within those theoretical debates, this paper discusses the expected consequences of political institutional design toward democratic transition and consolidation. This paper also highlights some deviation of the design in practice to argue that these expected consequences are not always the case. Nonetheless, this paper argues that political institutions indeed matter in creating rules and set limits of possible behavior of political actors and make certain outcomes more likely.
Presidentialism or Parliamentarism?
One fundamental question in countries that are experiencing transition from an authoritarian regime is about its constitutional framework. By constitutional framework is meant sets of agreements concerning government formation, conditions for government to rule and conditions by which government can be terminated democratically (Stephan & Skach, 1993). To put it simply, the constitutional framework is the system of government. In line with neo-institutionalists’ premises, supporters of governmental reform in those countries agreed that democracy also depends on the governmental system. Thus, redesigning the governmental system is part of the initial process in creating a new democratic government.
Among democracies, presidentialism and parliamentarism are two types of governmental system that are widely implemented. Presidentialism, that are implemented in countries like the United States, the Philippines, South Korea, Indonesia, and most of most countries in South America, is characterized mainly by separation of power between the executive and the legislature. This system is mutually independent, in which each branch has a fixed electoral mandate and its own source of legitimacy (Stephan & Skach, 1993). The president is the chief executive who runs the government for a certain period of time while the legislature has the right to propose bills. Defenders of presidentialism generally claim that presidential systems create more stability by the virtue of a fixed system. It also gives strong power to the president since he/she is often elected directly by the people. The separation of power between executive and legislature is also expected to bring a more accountable use of power since it allows each structure to supervise the other.
Parliamentarism, on the other hand, is a mutually dependent system in which executive power must be supported by the majority in the legislature (Stephan & Skach, 1993). Consequently, there is no power division between executive and legislature. Chief executives, as well as ministers, are member of the parliament. Such power organization is expected to bring more efficient and effective policy making since conflict between executive and legislative is less likely to occur. Another expected outcome is a more dispersed power that could prevent authoritarianism. The premier seldom tends to have as high importance as a ruling president, and there tends to be a higher focus on voting for a party and its political ideas than voting for an actual person (Stephan & Skach, 1993).
Among the theorists, Juan Linz, a professor of political science from Yale University, is one of the most prominent defenders of the parliamentarian system. In his influential essay “The Perils of Presidentialism”, Linz argued that parliamentarism is more conducive to stable democracy, especially in a nation with deep political cleavages with multiparty systems (1990). This argument is based on his extensive research in several countries, mainly in Latin America. According to Linz, parliamentarism is better because it provides a flexible and adaptable institutional ground which is conducive for democratic consolidation, for example through its consociational strategies and its dispute settlement instruments. On the other hand, presidentialism is seen to be less conducive for democracy, since it tends to concentrate power in the hand of president (Dahl, 1972; Linz, 1990; Lijphart, 1991). Thus, presidentialism is more inclined to authoritarianism. Further, Linz argued the presidential system tends to create a more rigid and formal system through a fixed presidential term and a zero sum electoral system. These rigidity and formal nature of the system, in some cases, have prevented the development of democracy (Linz, 1990).
The debates, however, continue to evolve. While at some points agreeing with Linz, Mainwaring & Shugart (1997) argue that presidentialism is not inherently flawed; rather it is subjected to institutional arrangements within the system. They claimed that presidentialism tends to function better where presidencies have weak legislative powers, parties are at least moderately disciplined, and party systems are not highly fragmented (Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997). Similarly, Donald Horowitz maintained that the problem is not about presidential or parliamentary system but stemmed from the electoral system. According to Horowitz, “democracy need electoral system that that foster conciliation and governmental systems that include rather than exclude, and “the winner takes all” system is definitely not the case” (Horowitz, 1990, 56). But why are winner-takes-all systems that are widely used in many democracies not conducive for democracy? Which electoral system is best for democracy? These questions will be discussed in the following section.
Plurality/Majority or Proportional Representative?
The second debate about constitutional design in new democracies is about electoral systems, particularly between plural/majority systems and proportional systems. This issue is fundamental since the electoral system is significantly related to the development of a country’s party system, its type of executive and the relationship between the executive and legislature (Lijphart, 1991). The party system is significant since the political party is the main and, to some extent, the only source for political elite recruitment. Further, the electoral system is also regarded as “the most specific manipulative instrument of politics” (Sartori 1968, 273).
The principle of plurality/majority systems is simple: candidates with the most votes are declared the winners. Yet, there is a difference between plurality and majority: while in the first system the winner simply the candidate with most votes, in the second system the winner is the candidate who won more than 50% from the total votes. As consequences, countries that are employing the plurality/majority system are likely to have two-party systems (the Duverger’s Law), one-party governments, and executive that are more powerful than the legislatures. To date, this cluster of electoral systems is found in the UK, Canada, India, the US, Bangladesh, Malaysia, and other former British colonies.
While the winner-takes-all characteristic of this system could result in strong single-party government and strong opposition in the legislature, it also tends to exclude smaller parties and minorities from fair representation. The system also allows close relations between representatives and constituents and encourages the emergence of ethnic-based parties which could exaggerate division among citizens. Nonetheless, the supporters of this system argue that since it tends to create two major parties, it also promotes integration between different societies. In Malaysia, for example, the Barisan Nasional government is made up of a broadly-based umbrella movement which fields Malay, Chinese and Indian candidates in areas of various ethnic complexions (IDEA Handbook 2005, 36).
The winner takes all system is frequently opposed with the Proportional Representation (PR) system, which has remain dominant system applied by 60% democracies in the world (Leduc, et.al, 2007). In contrast with the winner takes all system, in the PR system parties’ shares of the votes corresponds with their share of seats in the parliament. Consequently, PR requires the use of electoral districts with more than one member and the greater the number of representatives to be elected from a district (district magnitude), the more proportional the electoral system will be. In addition, PR systems tend to promote multiparty systems, coalition governments, and more equal executive-legislative power relations.
The strongest argument that favors the PR system is its ability to produce a more representative legislature. Its proportional character gives greater chance for minorities to be represented. For many new democracies, particularly those which face deep societal divisions, the inclusion of all significant groups in the legislature is the essential condition for democratic consolidation. Failing to ensure that both minorities and majorities have a stake in developing political systems can have catastrophic consequences. That is why some theorists encourage this system in a deeply divided society. To quote Lijphart: “PR was designed to provide minority representation and thereby to counteract potential threats to national unity and political stability” (Lijphart 1991, 75).
Critics to PR system generally are based on its tendency to create political fragmentation either in the party system, the parliament or in the grassroots driven by its multiparty character. Hence, instead of promoting integration, PR systems tend to exacerbate division within communities. Another weakness of PR that often mentioned is the effectiveness of the government, since PR systems tend to produce coalition government rather than a single party government. A coalition government is often viewed as prone to gridlock and less effective to carry out coherent policies (IDEA Handbook, 2005). Moreover, the nature of coalition government also gives less opportunity; for the voter to enforce accountability, for example to throwing party out of power.
Within the electoral system family, either plurality/majority or PR systems, it is clear that its efficacy depends strongly on the socio-cultural character in each country. In a new democracy where its society is highly divided along religious, ethnic, language, or other sociological lines, a system that could guarantee political representation and participation would be important. Participation should be emphasized because representation without ability to participate and to influence policy making would be meaningless. Another context that should be considered in crafting the electoral system is related its accessibility. By accessibility is meant that the voting process and technique are simple, so that voters from various education levels could access it correctly. In addition, the system should also guarantee that all citizen who have right to vote are technically able to access the ballot box. These seem to be technical matters, but could affect significant political issue such as voters’ turnout.
Conclusion: The Importance of Context
It is clear that the outcomes of a certain political institution cannot be taken for granted. It is likely impossible, for example, to determine which electoral system could produce more democratic and effective government. Moreover, some of theoretical consequences of a political institutions, be it governmental system or electoral systems, seems no longer relevant. The growing of Liberal-Democrat party in UK for example, envisaged that two party systems as the expected outcomes from the plurality/majority electoral system is become less relevant.
In practices those outcomes are strongly affected by context. Indeed, in many countries, presidential governments for example, are less successful in managing its democratic development, but in some countries presidential governments give more favorable condition for democracy. Further, it managed to reconcile rather than deteriorate ethnic conflict such as in Nigeria and Sri Lanka. Likewise, parliamentarism does not always lead to a stable democracy. Israel, Italy, French (1946-1958), Germany (1919-1933), and Indonesia (1948-1955), are such cases. These varieties clearly suggest that neither presidentialism nor parliamentarism are sufficient to bring a stable democracy, more over contexts in which those systems operate are essential. Contexts, in this regard, could be electoral system, party system, and political culture or degree of polarization. Nonetheless, institutional design indeed matter in establishing rules that would limits the range of possible behavior of political actors in order to make certain outcomes more likely.
References
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